ABSTRACT In the past decade, a number of chaos-based watermarking schemes have been proposed. Generally, it is widely accepted that the introduction of chaos effectively enhances the security of digital watermarking. Yet, taking a representative algorithm as an example, this paper reveals vulnerabilities of the chaos-based watermarking schemes against various attacks under Kerckhoff's principle, and the watermark can be successfully removed and decrypted. To achieve higher security, a sub key generation mechanism based on the feature codes of images (SKGM-FCI) is designed. The obtained watermarking key is related to the original images, such that individual sub keys are obtained for different host images. Benefiting from the SKGM-FCI, a blind watermarking scheme based on Discrete Cosine Transform domain of the scrambled image is further proposed and investigated. The theoretical analysis and simulation results validate the effectiveness and the high security level of the proposed scheme.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the rapid development of multimedia technology and network technology, multimedia data have been growth massive. At the same time, multimedia data security is already facing some serious challenges. For example, the sensitive data (such as medical images, copyright images) is illegally accessed, the private photos and videos is illegally tampered and forged, and the copyrighted images and videos are illegally disseminated and pirated.
To meet the challenge of multimedia data security, image encryption [1] - [4] , digital watermarking, information hiding [5] , [6] and other technologies have emerged. Among them, digital watermarking is considered to be a key technology for copyright protection. In recent years, a large variety of watermarking schemes [7] - [21] have been proposed. From the embedding of watermark, these algorithms can be divided into spatial domain [7] , [8] , Discrete Cosine Transform (DCT) domain [9] - [12] , Discrete Wavelet Transform (DWT) domain [13] - [16] , Compressive
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On the other hand, chaos has attracted much attention due to its inherent properties such as non-periodicity, wide spectrum, sensitive to initial conditions and system parameters, and randomness property [22] . In the past decade, various chaotic systems have been applied to watermarking or encryption algorithms. Arnold cat map [10] , [12] , [14] , [21] , as a one-to-one mapping, is used for permutation, and Logistic map [8] , [13] , [14] , [19] due to the simplicity, is widely used to produce random sequence. Other complex chaotic systems are also adopted for generating higher dimensional chaos, achieve large key space and more satisfactory random performance, such as coupled chaotic maps [8] and Memristive chaotic system [16] . Recently, some chaotic systems with one or more attractors have been reported to be applicable in applications such as circuit realization, random number generator (RNG) and S-box designs with better performance [23] - [25] . Also, due to the satisfactory security potential of chaotic system, its application in digital watermarking is thus a matter of course, and has been widely studied during the past few years. The application VOLUME 7, 2019 This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License. For more information, see http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ of these chaotic systems in watermarking can be divided into three categories: (i) Using chaotic systems scrambles or encrypts the original watermark for protecting the watermark information [10] , [11] , [13] , [16] , [20] . It is similar to the chaos-based encryption [26] - [28] .
(ii) Using random chaotic sequence controls the embedding position to prevent attackers extracting watermark information [8] , [14] , [19] .
(iii) Chaotic sequences are directly embedded into the original carrier as the watermark signal [15] . In these algorithms, the initial value or parameter of the chaotic system is usually used as the secret key. Watermarking security is a crucial issue for all kinds of algorithms [29] , [30] . Theoretical and analytical work on security has been proposed [29] - [35] , under Kerckhoffs principle, some of which focus on the security of spread spectrum (SS) [29] , [30] , [33] and quantization index modulation (QIM) algorithms [34] , [35] . Unfortunately, the security of chaos-based watermarking algorithms have almost not been deeply studied and cryptanalyzed. It is generally believed that chaos-based watermarking algorithms are secure due to large key space and good sensitivity [11] , [14] , [19] . However, from a point of view of modern cryptography, these are only the basic conditions for watermarking security. Therefore, it is important and necessary to further analyze and study the security of chaos-based watermarking algorithms. This is also the primary motivation of this paper.
In [13] , Liu et al. proposed a blind image watermarking scheme based on chaotic mixtures, the logo watermark is firstly scrambled by Logistic maps and then embedded into the 2-level DWT domain of the original image. It belongs to the second type of chaos-based watermarking mentioned above, which is a representative algorithm whose watermark signal is encrypted by chaotic system. In order to better present the existing security defects of some watermarking schemes, we take this algorithm as a typical example and analyze its security under the attack scenarios. In addition, we design a more secure blind chaos-based watermarking scheme to resist the cryptanalytic attacks. Overall, the main contributions of this paper can be summarized as follows.
i) The security of Liu et al's scheme is evaluated in detail in several attack scenarios. Further, to illustrate the universality of the problem, the security of other schemes is briefly discussed. ii) To resist the proposed attacks, a new and effective sub key generation mechanism based on the feature codes of images (SKGM-FCI) is designed. iii) Benefiting from the SKGM-FCI mechanism, a blind watermarking algorithm based on the DCT domain of the scrambled image is further proposed. Theoretical analysis and simulation results verify the high security level of the scheme. The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section II gives security analysis of a typical watermarking algorithm. Section III introduces the preliminaries and proposed watermarking scheme. The performance evaluation and security analysis are provided in Section IV and Section V, respectively. Finally, a conclusion is drawn in Section VI.
II. CRYPTANALYSIS OF WATERMARKING SCHEMES
To present the security problems of watermarking algorithms in detail. This section will first cryptanalyze a typical chaos-based algorithm under Kerckhoff's principle, and then the security of other algorithms are briefly analyzed and discussed. Finally, the common characteristic of the weaknesses of these algorithms are summarized.
A. BASIC CONCEPTS
First, some concepts related to watermarking security are briefly reviewed.
• Kerckhoff's principle: In cryptography, ''a cryptosystem should be secure even if everything about the system, except the key, is public knowledge'' [32] . The situation in a digital watermarking system is the same, namely, an attacker knows the embedding /detecting algorithms except for a secret key. The view is gradually accepted by more and more scholars [29] , [30] , [33] , [34] .
• Watermark security: Most studies adopt the Kaller's definition, watermarking security is defined as ''the inability by unauthorized users to access (i.e., to remove, to read, or to write the hidden message) the communication channel'' [31] . Here ''unauthorized users'' usually refers to the users without a secret key.
• Attack scenarios: According to Diffie-Hellman's terminology, Ref. [29] .
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Then calculate the maximum, minimum and average values of the block
Finally, the scrambled watermark, w i , is embedded by the following rules,
where α is the embedding strength. After all watermark bits are embedded and the inverse DWT transformation is performed, a watermarked image is constructed. The watermark extraction process is the inverse of Steps a-c), and its rule is
where ca s,t and mean represent the corresponding values of the received block, and w i is the extracted watermark bit.
2) REMOVING THE WATERMARK UNDER WOA SCENARIO
In this scenario, assume that an attacker obtains a watermarked image. First, using the extraction algorithm, he/she can acquire the coefficients of LL2 and its blocks. Assume that one of them is Ca = ca s,t ca s,t+1 ca s+1,t ca s+1,t+1 .
After that, he/she modifies ca s,t for the purpose of removing the watermark. Specifically, he calculates the maximum value max and the minimum value min of Ca, and changes ca s,t such that the expected watermark bit ''0'' or ''1'' is obtained by the followings
If he/she changes ca s,t of all the blocks to the minimum values min, a null watermark is obtained. The simulation results are shown in Fig. 1(a) . Figures 1(a) and 1(b) present the scrambled watermark and its recovered watermark via the extraction process, respectively. After the removing watermark attack, as expected, the extracted watermarks and its recovered watermark are null shown in Figs. 1(c) and 1(d). i.e., {SW 1 , SW 2 , . . . , SW num }. Then, num pairs of the original watermarks and the scrambled watermarks {(OW 1 , SW 1 ), (OW 2 , SW 2 ), . . . , (OW num , SW num )} are constructed.
From the view of cryptography, this is a problem about the cryptanalysis of permutation-only cipher [36] , [37] . Li et al [36] proposed a binary-tree (or multi-fork tree) analysis method to resolve this problem. They demonstrate that for a permutation-only binary image encryption, only need num = log 2 (H ×W ) pairs of plain-images and cipher-images to recovery the permutation matrix, here the permutation matrix is considered as an equivalent key, H × W denotes the size of the binary images. In the original scheme [13] , the size of the watermark images is (64 × 64), and thus the attacker only needs to collect log 2 (64 × 64) = 12 pairs of the watermarked images and the watermarks for obtaining the permutation matrix. The cost is very low and this attack is feasible. Once the permutation matrix (i.e, equivalent key) is revealed, the scrambled watermark is decrypted and a new logo watermark can also be forged.
C. DISCUSSION OF OTHER ALGORITHMS
The attacks proposed above is valid for other similar algorithms whose embedding positions are fixed [10] , [11] , [16] , [20] , and we omit a similar analysis process here due to space limitations. Next we will introduce another class of algorithms [8] , [14] whose embedding positions are determined by the key that can also be cryptanalyzed. Taking Ref. [14] for example, we give a rough analysis of security. In [14] , a combination of Logistic map and Arnold Cat map is used to determine the embedding positions of the watermark bits, where initial conditions of these maps are used as secret keys. Under KOA scenario, assume that an attacker accesses an arbitrary watermarked image and its original image. First, he/she will perform the same transformation on VOLUME 7, 2019 the watermarked image and the original image to obtain the coefficient matrix CM 1 and CM 2 . Then, a difference operation is made between the two, i.e, CM = CM 1 − CM 2 . Obviously, the non-zero positions of CM are embedded positions for watermark bits. The attacker saves the location map as ancillary information loc − map for the next attack. For example, assume that there is another new watermarked image. The attacker also applies the same transformation to obtain the new coefficient matrix CM 3 , and then modifies the coefficients of embedded watermark bits according to loc − map, which can remove the watermark, and also embed a new watermark to cause copyright disputes.
Based on the above analysis, we summarize the common characteristic of the weaknesses of the mentioned algorithm, that is, the embedding positions of the watermarking system are fixed, or it is only related to the key but not related to the image. To address this flaw, SKGM-FCI is designed in Section III-B.1.
III. PROPOSED SECURE WATERMARKING SCHEME
In the second section, the preliminaries is introduced first, and then a secure watermarking scheme is presented in detail.
A. PRELIMINARIES
Singular value decomposition and Logistic map used in the scheme are introduced as follows.
1) SINGULAR VALUE DECOMPOSITION

Singular value decomposition (SVD) is an orthogonal transform which is defined as
where A is an original matrix of size n × m (suppose n ≤ m), U, V are two orthogonal matrices with sizes of n × n, m × m, and S is a singular value matrix whose singular values satisfy
There are two distinct properties of SVD transformation, one is the singular values of an image are much less affected after the common image processing, such as filtering, compression, and the another is the singular values represent intrinsic algebraic image properties.
2) LOGISTIC MAP
Logistic map is widely used in digital watermarking and multimedia encryption due to the simplicity, and it's equation is expressed by where µ and x 0 are the parameter and the initial state value. The digital sequence generated from the chaotic sequence above is expressed by
where x denotes an integer less than x. If R = 2 in Eq. (7), a binary sequence {b i } is produced as the follows:
Auto-correlation (AC) and cross-correlation (CC) coefficients are introduced to evaluate the statistical properties of binary sequences and they are defined as the following [38] : (9) and (10).
B. WATERMARK EMBEDDING
A digital watermarking system should consist of two parts: watermark embedding and watermark extraction. The architecture of the watermark embedding process proposed is illustrated in Fig. 3 , and is composed of three procedures: sub key generation mechanism based on the feature codes of images (SKGM-FCI), embedding procedure I and embedding procedure II. In the SKGM-FCI procedure, the generation of the sub keys is related to the main key Key1 and the original image. In the embedding procedure I, a logo watermark is embedded in an original image. In the embedding procedure II, an oriented watermark, i.e., a binary chaotic sequence, is embedded in the watermarked image I. In the following sections, the aforementioned procedures will be described in detail.
1) SKGM-FCI PROCEDURE
First, the framework of SKGM-FCI is shown in Fig. 4 and its pseudo code in Algorithm 1. The goal of SKGM-FCI is to produce individual sub keys for different images with the same main key. During watermark embedding, the feature codes of an original image OI are extracted by
Then mix the feature codes FC with the main key Key1 by the form
In this paper, TM is defined as TM = Key1||FC where the symbol || stands for a concatenation operation. Finally, calculate the hash value of TM and generate a sub key SK through
To extract watermark, the operator must have the same SK . For non-blind watermarking schemes (e.g., SS scheme), Each block of (m + n) × (m + n) is divided into two sub-blocks, the sizes of which are n × n.
the operator can generate the same SK , but for blind watermarking schemes (e.g., DM-QIM scheme), the original image is unavailable. Considering a blind watermarking scheme, a feature codes extraction method should meet the following requirements.
• Robustness: The feature codes extracted from the same digital content should be the identical, including the original image, the corresponding watermarked image as well as other attacked images produced by common attacks (such as JPEG compression).
• Distinctiveness: The feature codes extracted from different images should be distinct. In other words, the contents' feature codes are unique. Hoverer, the above two indicators are contradictory: it is a difficult task and it needs to be trade-offs in the design process. Here, a effective binary feature codes extraction method based on SVD is presented.
Further divide each block into two sub blocks shown in Fig. 5 , the sizes of which are n × n. Thus, these sub blocks are labeled as OI i , i = 1, 2, . . . , 2l. b) Calculate the singular value S i of sub blocks OI i by Eq. (5). Then obtain the maximum singular value s mi for S i . c) Compare any two different singular values s mi and s mj to obtain a binary feature codes sequence {FC k } according to the following rule.
where
2) EMBEDDING PROCEDURE I
The embedding procedure I is described in Fig. 6 and its pseudo code in Algorithm 2. A binary logo watermark LW of size H × W is embedded in the original image OI of size
, and a watermarked image WI 1 is produced. The embedding steps are described as follows in detail: a) By using Key2, generate a chaotic sequence x and further get an index sequence α: iterate Eq. (6) with Key2 (µ 1 and x 0 ) for N 0 times to avoid the 
In this paper, we set N 0 = 500. Sort the chaotic sequence x in ascending order, and obtain a new sequence x = x α 1 , x α 2 , . . . , x α M ×N . Thus an index sequence α = {α 1 , α 2 , . . . , α M ×N } is available. b) By using α, scramble the original image: the original image is scrambled by
where OI α j and SI j represent the α j th and j th pixels of the original image OI and the scrambled image SI, respectively. c) The scrambled image is transformed by using DCT. d) By using x, encrypt the logo watermark: take the earlier elements of the sequence x, calculate Eq. (7) and obtain a binary sequence {k i }, i = 1, 2, . . . , H × W . Then the logo watermark is encrypted by
where the symbol ⊕ denotes bitwise XOR, and w j and w j represent the j th elements of the original and the encrypted logo watermarks, respectively. e) By using Key1, generate another chaotic sequence y and get another index sequence β: first input Key1 and the original image to SKGM-FCI module, which outputs a binary sub key SK , and then it is converted to a floating point number
where SK i denotes the i th bit of the sub key SK . Set µ 2 = 3.99999999999999 and the initial value y 0 , similar as the Step 1), obtain another index sequence β= {β 1 , β 2 , . . . , β M ×N }. f) By using β, the encrypted logo watermark bits are randomly embedded in the DCT coefficients of the scrambled image: take the first H × W elements of the index sequence β to determine the embedding positions. To achieve blind extraction, QIM method [7] is used as following where c β i denotes the (β i ) th of the selected coefficient for embedding i th watermark bit, denotes the quantization step size, and the operation of round(x) returns an integer to the nearest x. g) Obtain the watermarked image I: the embedded image is transformed by using IDCT and inverse permutation, and the watermarked image WI 1 is obtained.
3) EMBEDDING PROCEDURE II
A binary chaotic sequence called an oriented watermark is embedded twice after the logo watermark is hidden. The embedding procedure II is illustrated in Fig. 7 and its pseudo code in Algorithm 1. a) By using Key3, generate an oriented watermark OW : similar as the Step a) of Section III-B.2, a new chaotic sequence z is obtained with Key3 (µ 3 and z 0 ), and the sequence length len ow ≤ 0.5 × min(M , N ). Then applying Eq. (7) generates a binary sequence as an oriented watermark OW . b) Construct an orientation template and embed the oriented watermark OW : choose the central position ( 0.5 × M , 0.5 × N ) in the watermarked image I as a starting point (i.e., the axis origin), two symmetrical directions are randomly fixed, 90 • − θ and 90 • + θ, θ ∈ (0, 90 • ), as an orientation template. Since the synthesis of the two directions is always 90 • ) regardless of θ, the value of θ does not need to be recorded. Then the oriented watermark OW is embedded in the two directions by using QIM method (Eq. (18)) with another embedding intensity .
C. WATERMARK DETECTION AND EXTRACTION
Given a received watermarked image, there exist two processes: the detection process for the oriented watermark and the extraction process for the logo watermark, as shown in Fig. 8 . The former is to check whether the received image is changed, and further to determine the geometric transformation parameters of the changed image and to reshape the image based on these parameters. The latter is to extract the logo watermark from the reshaped image. The extraction process is the inverse process of embedding I, while the detection process needs further explanation. Its pseudo code in Algorithm 4, and the specific steps are described below. We calculate all corresponding cross-correlation value CC ϕ (0) between OW ϕ and OW by using Eq. (10). And then find its two maximum values, which are recorded as CC δ 0 (0) and CC δ 1 (0). Thus rotation angle of the received image can be computed as
c) Reshape the image. Rotate the image counter clockwise by δ, and then obtain a reshaped image. Remark 1: Note that the image may suffer from a translation attack. In this case we can translate images by different distances, and then re-performing correlation detection and calculate parameters. Some examples of correlation detection are given in Section IV-E.
D. EXTENDED TO THE COLOR IMAGES
In most applications, the multimedia data need to be protected are transmitted and stored in the form of color images. Interestingly, the proposed watermarking scheme can be easily extended to color images with only a few additional steps. To achieve better imperceptibility and robustness performances, an watermark is usually embedded in the YCrCb space [10] , [21] , [39] . The so-called YCbCr space, which stores the luminance signal Y, the blue difference signal Cb, and the red differential signal Cr of the color image. In addition, YCbCr can be obtained by RGB conversion [39] 
For a raw 24-bit RGB image, we first convert it to YCrCb space by using the above equation. Then, we select the Y channel for the SKGM-FCI procedure and the embedding procedure I and II, and get a watermarked Y-channel image.
Next, combine it with Cr and Cb channels and convert them back into RGB space
Thus we obtain an RGB color image embedded with watermarks. For watermark extraction, it is also converted to the YCbCr space (Eq. (21)), and then the remaining watermark extraction steps in Section III-C are applied in the Y channel.
IV. EFFECTIVENESS ANALYSIS AND SIMULATION
In this section, simulation experiments are used to verify the validity of the proposed SKGM-FCI mechanism, then to demonstrate the superiority and effectiveness of watermark embedded in DCT domain of the scrambled image. Finally, we evaluate the performance of the whole watermarking system in both imperceptibility and robustness.
A. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP AND EVALUATION METRIC
In the following experiments, five USC-SIPI gray-scale images of size 512 × 512 are adopted as the original images, whereas a 64 × 64 binary image (BUPT) is chosen as a logo watermark, as shown in Fig. 9 . Two binary pseudo-random sequences of 150-bit are used as an oriented watermark, which is determined by Key3, i.e., µ = 3.97986502162631 and z 0 = 0.64246416698522. The quantization steps = 36 and = 18 are used in the embedding procedures I and II. In the SKGM-FCI, given m = 100, n = 68, then 18 singular values and 153-bit feature codes FC are obtained. The simulation is implemented in MATLAB 2014a.
To quantitatively evaluate the performance of the system, we employ various performance metrics, such as peak signal to noise ratio (PSNR), structural similarity (SSIM) [40] , normalized cross correlation (NC) and bit error rate (BER). PSNR and SSIM are used to evaluate the quality of the watermarked images or the attacked versions. PSNR is defined by the following forms PSNR = 10 log 10 255
where OI i,j and WI i,j denote the pixels of the original and the watermarked images. And SSIM is defined by
where µ X and µ Y are the means of the original image OI and the watermarked image WI, respectively. σ X and σ Y are the variances of OI and WI, respectively, and σ XY is the covariance between OI and WI. λ1, λ2, λ3, C 1 , C 2 and C 3 are constants. SSIM ranges in [0, 1], and the larger the value, the smaller the image distortion. Meanwhile we adopt NC and BER indexes to measure the accuracy of the extracted watermark. They are defined as
where W i and W i are the i th bit of the original watermark and the extracted watermark, respectively.
B. EFFECTIVENESS ANALYSIS OF THE SKGM-FCI 1) FEATURE CODES AND SUB KEYS FOR DIFFERENT IMAGES
In this experiment, we extract the feature codes of different images and then obtain a few corresponding sub keys. For different security levels, the lengths of the main key can be chosen 128-bit, 256-bit and 512-bit. In simulations, we take a 128-bits main key Key1 and SHA3-256 algorithm with block length 1088 bits. We concatenate the feature codes FC with the main key Key1, subsequently pad zeroes such that 1088-bit length the message is obtained, i.e., TM = Key1 FC 00 · · · 0. After SHA3-256 algorithm, a 256-bit sub key is generated. Table 1 shows the feature codes of five test images and the corresponding sub keys. In simulations we arbitrarily take a Key1 with hexadecimal format Key1 = bae63457983b9e7d 052f 5867dee30024. The simulation results show that the five different images have distinguishing feature codes, and the obtained sub keys have good randomness due to hash functions. 
2) ROBUSTNESS OF FEATURE CODES
The feature codes of an original image and its watermarked image should be identical. Assume the channel is ideal without noise and any attacks. We compare the features codes of five original and their watermarked images, and find that the features codes of five pairs of images are synchronous. The results are presented in Table 2 .
In fact, noise and malicious attacks usually exist in the channel. Considering image processing operations, such as compression, filtering and geometric transformation, we should investigate the features codes of the watermarked image. In particular, we focus on the additive Gaussian white noise (AGWN) and JPEG compression, the results of which are shown in Tables 3 and 4 , respectively. As can be seen from Table 3 , the larger the noise variance the worse the quality of the watermark image (PSNR). But the features codes are still synchronous, even when the variance σ = 20 such that PSNR reduces to 22.09 dB. These results represent that this method of feature code extraction is robust to AWGN. In Table 4 , different compression factors for JPEG compression are evaluated and it is found that the feature codes are synchronous even at compression factor Q = 10.
Furthermore, other types of attacks are tested and the corresponding results are shown in Table 5 . As can be observed, the designed feature codes are synchronized under four filtering attacks, but it is non-synchronized under mean filtering attack with 5 × 5 window (its PSNR is only 28.3 dB). Meanwhile, the feature codes extraction method can resist rotation attack and translation attacks (Other related simulation are shown in Section IV-E), but it cannot resist the cropping attack.
C. EFFECTIVENESS ANALYSIS OF THE EMBEDDING DOMAIN
In the proposed scheme, the watermark is embedded in the DCT domain of the scrambled image that has the following advantages:
• High embedding capacity up to (M × N − 1) bits:
First, the DCT coefficient distribution of the scrambled image is similar to that of noise, which provides more embedded positions (except the direct component (DC) coefficient). Simulation results are shown in Fig. 10 . The DCT coefficients (except DC coefficient) of the scrambled Lena image are distributed in [−300,300] and similarly as that of noise, while the DCT coefficients of the original image (except DC coefficient) are distributed in [−5200, 5200], and there are about 3 × 10 4 coefficients close to zero, they cannot be used as an embedded position due to being easily erased by image processing. To further verify that the DCT energy of the scrambled image is not concentrated in the upper right corner (low frequency region), we calculate the energies of the upper right corner of the two DCT coefficient matrices (size 128 × 128, but except for the DC energy), and then divide by the total energy of the image (also except for the DC energy), defined as energy ratio. The experimental results are presented in Table 6 . The average energy rate of five original images is about 90.53%, while the average energy rate of five scrambled images is about 6.26%, being approximately equal to the theoretical value i.e., (128 × 128 − 1)/(512 × 512 − 1).
• Robust performance is independent of the selected frequency regions: for the different regions of the DCT coefficient matrix of the original image, the robustness performances are different under the JPEG compression: the low frequency (LF) region shows best robustness, then the intermediate frequency IF) region, and the high frequency (HF) region is worst. However, from the Human Visual System (HVS) point of view, the human's eye is very sensitive to the low frequencies and is not sensitive to the high frequency coefficients [41] .
To reach a compromise between robustness and visual invisibility, the watermark is usually embedded in the intermediate frequency region. However, we does not need to consider the embedded frequency region, because all frequency regions of the scheme provide the same robust performance, especially under JPEG compression. Next, several simulation results are given to prove the above conclusion. For the sake of convenience, the upper left corner of the DCT coefficients matrix (size 512 × 512) is denoted as the coordinate origin (1,1). Then, three rectangular regions of size 64 × 64 are defined as LF: from coordinates (11, 11) It can be seen that all the curves are coincident approximately, because the noise generated is independent of the images and its frequency distribution is evenly distributed.
D. IMPERCEPTIBILITY EVALUATION
There are two embedding procedures in our scheme. First, a logo watermark with 4096 bits capacity is embedded, and then an oriented watermark with 150 bits capacity is embedded twice. In this way, the watermarked images I and the watermarked images II will be output. Table 7 presents the values of PSNR and SSIM for the 5 test images in two embedding processes. From Table 7 , we can observe that PSNR ≥ 45.61dB and SSIM ≥ 0.99 for the watermarked images I and there are no declines for the watermarked image II. The results indicate that the proposed scheme has good image perceptual quality. 
E. ROBUSTNESS EVALUATION
To evaluate watermark robustness to common image processing operations, AGWN with different intensity, the JPEG compression with different quality factors, rotation and translation transformations, and filtering are considered. The detailed simulation results are listed in Table 8 .
It can be seen that the proposed scheme is robust to AGWN with intensity σ ≤ 8, the watermark can be correctly extracted with BER = 0.26 and NC = 0.84. The scheme is also robust to the JPEG compression when Q ≤ 80, BER and NC of the extracted watermark are 0.23 and 0.86, respectively. For filtering operations, it can resist Gaussian low pass filtering, but cannot resist mean filtering and median filtering attacks.
To verify the proposed algorithm can resist rotation and translation transformations, the following three experiments are operated on Lena image:
• Detection of the oriented watermark without geometric attack: In the embedding process II, the oriented watermark is embedded in 30 • and 150 • directions, respectively ( Fig. 12(a) ). The receiver extracts the possible binary sequences at all directions, then performs correlation detection with the original oriented watermark. The detection results are shown in Fig. 12(b) .
• Detection of the oriented watermark under a rotation attack: The watermarked image is rotated counterclockwise ( Fig. 12(c) ). We detect similarly as experiment (1), and the results are presented in Fig. 12(d) . • Detection of the oriented watermark under a translation attack: For simplicity, it is assumed that the watermarked image is shifted 40 pixels at 30 • clockwise direction. (Fig. 12(e) ). The receiver extracts the possible binary sequences at different shifting pixel distance (at 30 • clockwise direction) and performs correlation detection with the original oriented watermark. The results are shown in Fig. 12 Fig. 12(a) , while the marked direction 98 • indicates to rotate 8 • counterclockwise in Fig. 12(c) . In Fig. 12(f) , it is obvious that the received image in Fig. 12 (e) is shifted with 40 pixels.
V. SECURITY PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS A. KEY SPACE
The proposed system has three types of keys, Key1, Key2, and Key3. As mentioned in Section IV-B.1, Key1 is a binary string whose length can be 128, 256 or 512 bits. The keys Key2 and Key3 are made up of two floating point numbers (µ, x 0 ) where x 0 ∈ [0, 1] and µ ∈ [3.57, 4]. In our simulation, 64-bit double precision floating point numbers is adopted. According to the IEEE floating-point standard [42] , the precision of the computer is about 10 −15 . In addition, since symmetry of Logistic map, i.e., f (x 0 ) = f (1 − x 0 ), the effective key space of x 0 is reduced by half [43] 708 , respectively. This indicates that each key space is large enough to resist against brute-force attacks.
B. KEY SENSITIVITY
We first check the sensitivity of Key2. Given a Key2 (µ, x 0 ) and a wrong Key2 (μ = µ + 10 −15 ,x 0 = x 0 + 10 −15 ), then two corresponding scrambled images and the difference between them can be obtained, as shown in Figs. 13(a)-13(c) . The differential image shows the satisfactory sensitivity of Key2 because the behavior of chaotic system is sensitive to the initial conditions and the parameters. To check the sensitivity of Key1, one bit of Key1 is modified, i.e., bae63457983b9e7d052f 5867dee30025, to extract the watermark and the results are shown in Figs. 13(d)-13(f) .
C. CRYPTANALYSIS
The goal of cryptanalysis is to obtain all or partial keys, or equivalent keys. After obtaining the keys, the attacker can do the following thing: unauthorized embedding, unauthorized decoding and unauthorized removal [44] . The security of the proposed scheme mainly depends on Key1 and Key2, where Key1 and the feature codes of the image together determine the embedding position, and Key2 is used to scramble the original image and encrypt the logo watermark. Now, the whole watermarking system under different attack scenarios are analyzed:
In the WOA scenario, an attacker obtains only a series of watermarked images. Assume that he/she made some statistical analysis in the spatial domain of the watermarked images, but it is difficult problem. Because the watermark bits are embedded in the different DCT coefficients for different original images, and after IDCT transform, the watermark bits will spread to the whole space domain. In addition, the permutation is secret (i.e, Key2), so he/she cannot access the DCT domain of the scrambled image.
In the KOA scenario, an attacker can obtain a few watermarked images and the corresponding original image. An attacker may apply a differential attack method, i.e., he/she calculates the difference between the two images to get information of the keys. But the differences are not the identical, because the selected embedding coefficient depends on not only Key1 but also the feature codes of different image. So it is almost impossible to recover the keys.
In the KMA scenario, an attacker collect several watermarked image and watermark pairs. In this case, he/she may establishes mapping relationship from different watermarks to different watermarked images. It is also difficult to break the system, because as long as the image contents or the feature codes are changed, the embedding positions of the watermark will be changed.
To further demonstrate the high security of the system, supposed that Key2 are guessed by the attacker, the probability is 1 2 98 as mentioned in Section V-A. He/she will performs 
The results show that the probability is smaller than the brute exhaustive Key1, which means the proposed scheme is very secure. Furthermore, suppose the attacker already has a part of the sub keys SK i , he/she will derives the main key Key1 or predicts the other sub key SK j with less cost. But, the difficulty of breaking SKGM-FCI is equivalent to break hash functions. Based on the above analysis, the security of the proposed watermarking system with SKGM-FCI is greatly enhanced by one-way hash functions and one-time pad mechanism.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
This paper focuses on the security of chaos-based watermarking algorithms from the perspective of cryptography. Taking Liu et al's scheme as an example, the security of algorithm is studied and analyzed, both the theoretical analysis and experimental result reveal its vulnerability against various attacks in WOA or KMA scenario. For security enhancement, a sub key generation mechanism based on feature codes of images (SKGM-FCI) is further proposed and employed to design a blind watermarking scheme based on the DCT domain of the scrambled image. Security analysis and simulation results demonstrate that it can resist against known cryptanalytic attacks and achieve high security level. The proposed enhancement method can also be applied to other chaos-based watermarking systems [8] , [13] , [14] . Namely, SKGM-FCI can be used as a separate module to generate the watermarking key related to the original image. However, the influence of the method on the overall performance of the algorithm, such as synchronization and robustness, needs to be further studied in the future.
